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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The Federal Arbitration Act1 and the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards2 
guarantee the enforceability of domestic and international ar-
bitration agreements.3  As federal law, these guarantees pre-
sumably preempt any attempt by a state to prohibit arbitration 
agreements in insurance contracts.4 However, Congress com-
plicated preemption questions involving the state regulation of 
insurance by enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act,5 which 
shelters states’ regulatory schemes from implied preemption by 
“Acts of Congress.”6  Although courts generally agree that 
McCarran-Ferguson shields state prohibitions of arbitration 
agreements in insurance contracts from preemption by the 
Federal Arbitration Act’s guarantee of enforcement of domestic 
arbitration agreements, they disagree as to whether McCarran-
Ferguson similarly protects state law from the New York Con-
vention’s guarantee of the enforceability of international arbi-
tration agreements. 
This Article argues that the self-execution framework that 
courts have adopted—and scholars have endorsed—in address-
ing whether McCarran-Ferguson enables states to reverse 
preempt the New York Convention is inadequate.7  First, the 
                                                     
1 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
2 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter New York Convention].  
3 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24–25 (1983) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act provides a substantive 
rule that arbitration agreements are generally valid); see also 9 U.S.C. § 201 
(2006) (applying this guarantee to agreements arising under the New York 
Convention). 
4 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that federal law is the supreme 
law of the land). 
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006).  
6 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 428 (2003).  For a more in 
depth discussion of McCarran–Ferguson, see infra Part II and II.B.   
7 See, e.g., Mariana Isabel Hernández-Gutiérrez, The Remaining Hostility 
Towards Arbitration Shielded by the McCarran–Ferguson Act: How Far 
Should the Protection to Policyholders Go?, 1 U. PUERTO RICO BUS. L.J. 35, 60-
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Article addresses the interpretive question: what is an “Act of 
Congress” under McCarran-Ferguson? By examining whether a 
treaty is self or non-self-executing, courts discard proper meth-
ods of statutory interpretation.  Second, the Article argues that 
courts have failed to satisfactorily transpose the self-execution 
doctrine—which has been relevant only in determining wheth-
er a treaty confers a legally enforceable right in the U.S.—into 
the context of the conflict between McCarran-Ferguson and the 
New York Convention.  Finally, the Article argues that the 
treaty’s self-executing or non-self-executing status is irrelevant 
because enforcing an international arbitration agreement un-
der the New York Convention implicates Chapter 2 of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act—which implemented the Convention—and 
McCarran-Ferguson permits a state law to reverse preempt an 
Act of Congress.  Since the self-execution approach fails to an-
swer the interpretive problem posed by McCarran-Ferguson, 
practitioners and courts should adopt an alternative approach 
that is more consistent with proper methods of statutory inter-
pretation. 
 Part II of this Article sets up the framework in which the 
previously mentioned legal question arises.  It reviews federal 
law governing the enforceability of arbitration agreements, in-
cluding the Federal Arbitration Act, the New York Convention, 
and McCarran-Ferguson’s reverse preemption scheme as it re-
lates to federal arbitration law.  Part III introduces the disa-
greement between federal courts as to whether McCarran-
Ferguson permits states to reverse preempt the implementa-
                                                                                                                       
61 (2010); Timothy B. Parlin, Arbitration Clauses in International Insurance 
Contracts Trump State Law Restrictions, 199 N.J.L.J. 578, 578 (2010) (both 
endorsing the self-executing framework). “Reverse preemption” or “inverse 
preemption” means that a state law is not “invalidate[d], impair[ed], or su-
persede[d],” by a federal law. See Susan Randall, Mandatory Arbitration in 
Insurance Disputes: Inverse Preemption of the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 
CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 272 n.72 (2005) (using both terms to refer to the effect of 
Section 2(b) of McCarran–Ferguson); 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006) (stating: “No 
act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law 
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, 
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically 
relates to the business of insurance.”). These terms are somewhat misleading 
because for a state law to “inverse preempt” or “reverse preempt” a federal 
law under McCarran–Ferguson, the two laws do not need to conflict. See in-
fra Part II.B (explaining that that McCarran–Ferguson is primarily a rule of 
construction).   
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tion of the New York Convention to the extent that it may be 
applied to the business of insurance.  Part IV argues that the 
methodology of resolving this disagreement—which currently 
centers on whether or not the New York Convention is a self-
executing treaty—inadequately addresses Congress’s purpose 
in enacting McCarran-Ferguson.  It further contends that re-
gardless of the self-executing or non-self-executing status of the 
New York Convention, McCarran-Ferguson protects state law 
from preemption by the substantive guarantees of the New 
York Convention because an Act of Congress, Chapter 2 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, provides the sole mechanism for the 
enforcement and recognition of international arbitration 
agreements under the Convention.  Part V briefly concludes 
this Article. 
II. THE INTERPRETIVE QUESTION OF MCCARRAN-FERGUSON: IS 
THE NEW YORK CONVENTION AN “ACT OF CONGRESS”? 
 McCarran-Ferguson provides that “[n]o Act of Congress 
shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law 
enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the business 
of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the busi-
ness of insurance.”8  Although there is little doubt that legisla-
tion passed by Congress usually constitutes an “Act of Con-
gress,” courts have disagreed about whether a treaty that has 
been implemented by domestic legislation is also an “Act of 
Congress.” 
A. Law Governing Arbitration Agreements in the United 
States 
Many states were initially hostile to agreements to submit 
private disputes to arbitration.9  State courts were hostile be-
                                                     
8 McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33, § 2(b) (1945) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2009)). 
9 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 593 (2008); LON L. 
FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 433 (3d ed. 1972). 
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cause they were disfavored at common law.10  When judges 
were paid per case they handled, they had financial incentives 
to expand, rather than minimize, their jurisdiction and in-
crease the number of cases on their dockets.11  This hostility 
toward arbitration continued at common law in the United 
States because judges continued to be skeptical of arbitration 
agreements that “ousted courts of their jurisdiction” to hear 
disputes.12  The opposition also stemmed from concerns “that 
arbitrators were ill-equipped ‘to administer justice’”13 and that 
arbitrators’ decisions were unreviewable.14 
1. The Federal Arbitration Act 
In 1925, Congress ended most states’ hostility toward arbi-
tration by enacting the Federal Arbitration Act, which provided 
for the general validity of arbitration agreements.15  Under sec-
tion 2 of Chapter 1, an arbitration agreement is valid if two 
conditions are met.16  First, the arbitration agreement must be 
included in a written contract involving interstate commerce or 
implicating maritime law.17  Second, the arbitration clause 
must not be revocable for reasons that exist at law or equity.18  
Such grounds for revocation include subject-neutral19 contrac-
tual defenses that demonstrate the invalidity of a contract at 
                                                     
10 Patrick M. Birney, Reawakening Section 1334: Resolving the Conflict 
Between Bankruptcy and Arbitration Through Abstention Analysis, 16 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 619, 626–27 (2008).  
11 ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., ARBITRATION 64 (3d ed. 2006) (explaining: 
“[s]omewhat more cynically, one might also suppose that it originated in con-
siderations of competition for business, at a time when judge’s salaries still 
depended on fees paid by litigants.”). 
12 FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 9, at 432–34.  
13 Donald E. Johnson, Has Allied-Bruce Teminix Cos. v. Dobsons Exter-
minated Alabama’s Anti-Arbitration Rule?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 577, 580 (1996). 
14 See Rogers v. Dep’t of Def. Dependents Sch., 814 F.2d 1549, 1553–54 
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that arbitrators’ decisions are “virtually unre-
viewable on appeal”).  
15 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
16 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1984). 
17 Id. at 11. 
18 Id.  
19 See id. at 16 (explaining that “[i]n creating a substantive rule applica-
ble in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state leg-
islative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements”). 
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the outset the agreement20 such as mutual mistake, fraud, du-
ress,21 and unconscionability.22 
By enacting the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress estab-
lished a federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.23  This policy was supported by the oft-cited bene-
fits of arbitration.  Arbitration can be a quicker and cheaper al-
ternative to litigation because it reduces courts’ case loads.24  It 
can also encourage parties to settle their disputes more cooper-
atively by removing the dispute to a relatively informal, confi-
dential setting.25  Arbitration can even provide parties with in-
creased flexibility by permitting them to choose arbitrators who 
have “expert knowledge of the subject matter in dispute.”26  
At the time Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, 
it was generally understood that the Act established proce-
dures by which federal courts would enforce arbitration agree-
ments.27  In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con-
struction Corporation,28 however, the Supreme Court held that 
Section 2 created a federal substantive right29 rooted in Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause.30  Section 2 thereby 
preempted most state laws that prohibited the enforcement of 
such agreements by guaranteeing the substantive right in state 
courts.31  The Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital effec-
                                                     
20 See County of Middlesex v. Gevyn Constr. Corp., 450 F.2d 53, 56 
(1971).  
21 Id. 
22 Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resur-
gence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFFALO L. REV. 185, 189–220 (2004). 
23 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24–25 (1983). 
24 RAU ET AL., supra note 11, at 4. 
25 Id. at 5. 
26 Id. 
27 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25–29 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting).  
28 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 10, 16.  
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tively ended any residual state hostility toward arbitration.32 
 2. The New York Convention 
In 1958, forty-five countries convened in New York to ne-
gotiate and draft a treaty to promote the international en-
forcement and recognition of international arbitration agree-
ments and foreign arbitral awards.33  The conference was called 
in response to the increasing popularity and success of interna-
tional arbitration.34  Although the United States was present at 
the conference, its role in the drafting and negotiating the trea-
ty was limited.35  The United States hesitated to involve itself 
in the negotiations due to its concerns that an arbitration trea-
ty would conflict with domestic law.36  At the close of the con-
ference, the United States withheld its signature from the 
Convention.37 
 Over the next decade, the United States began to 
acknowledge the benefits of joining the New York Convention.38  
In 1968, Under Secretary Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach 
sent to President Lyndon B. Johnson a Letter of Transmittal 
recommending the President’s submission of the New York 
Convention to Congress for its advice and consent.39  Under 
Secretary Katzenbach urged President Johnson to recommend 
that Congress pass domestic legislation to conform U.S. law to 
the Convention’s requirements.40  Taking his advice, President 
                                                     
32 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1974). 
33 Letter from Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Under Sec’y, to Lyndon 
B. Johnson, President (Apr. 13, 1968), in NEW STRATEGIES FOR PEACEFUL 
RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 5–7 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n 
ed., 1971) [hereinafter Katzenbach Letter]. 
34 See id. 
35 James van R. Springer, The United Nations Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, in NEW STRATEGIES FOR 
PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 25–26 (Am. Ar-
bitration Ass’n ed., 1971). 
36 John P. McMahon, Implementation of the UN Convention on Foreign 
Arbitral Awards in the U.S., in NEW STRATEGIES FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION 
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 75, 77 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n ed., 
1971).  
37 Id. 
38 Katzenbach Letter, supra note 33, at 5-6. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
2012]            DISPUTING ARBITRATION CLAUSES  47 
                        IN INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE  
                    AGREEMENTS: PROBLEMS WITH THE 
                       SELF-EXECUTION FRAMEWORK 
Johnson submitted the treaty to Congress for its advice and 
consent, insisting that Congress resolve any conflicts between 
the Federal Arbitration Act and the New York Convention.41  
Congress unanimously approved the Convention42 and subse-
quently amended the Federal Arbitration Act to implement the 
New York Convention.43 
The United States committed to recognizing and enforcing 
international arbitration agreements when it finally acceded to 
the New York Convention in 1970.44  Article II of the New York 
Convention provides for the enforcement of international arbi-
tration agreements.45  It states, “Contracting State[s] shall rec-
ognize an agreement in writing under which the parties under-
take to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have 
arisen or which may rise between them . . . concerning a sub-
ject matter capable of arbitration.”46  It clarifies that an 
“agreement in writing” includes an arbitration clause in a con-
tract or a separate arbitration agreement that is either signed 
by the parties or is “contained in an exchange of letters or tele-
grams.”47  It further directs a court of a Contracting State to re-
fer a matter to arbitration upon a party’s showing of a written 
arbitration agreement unless the court finds the agreement to 
be “null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being per-
formed.”48  Article V provides that the recognition and enforce-
ment of an arbitral award may be refused if the award is made 
pursuant to an Article II “agreement [that] is not valid under 
the law to which the parties have subjected it or . . . under the 
                                                     
41 114 CONG. REC. 10,488 (1968).  
42 114 CONG. REC. 29,605 (1968). 
43 Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970). 
44 See Kevin T. Jacobs & Matthew G. Paulson, The Convergence of Re-
newed Nationalization, Rising Commodities, and “Americanization” in Inter-
national Arbitration and the Need for More Rigorous Legal and Procedural 
Defenses, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 359, 362 n.16 (2008) (explaining that the United 
States ratified the Convention in 1970). 
45 New York Convention, supra note 2, art. II. 
46 Id. art. II(1). 
47 Id. art II(2). 
48 Id. art. II(3). 
48 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.  3:2 
law of the country in which the award was made.”49 
 As per President Johnson’s insistence, Congress added a 
second chapter to the Federal Arbitration Act to implement the 
Convention.50  The first section of Chapter 2 provides that the 
“[New York] Convention shall be enforced in United States 
courts in accordance with this chapter.”51  The second section 
stipulates which agreements shall be deemed to fall under the 
Convention.  In particular, it deems all arbitration agreements 
arising out of legal commercial relationships to “fall[] under the 
Convention” unless the agreement is entirely between U.S. cit-
izens or businesses that are either incorporated or have their 
principal place of business in the United States and their legal 
relationship has no “reasonable relation with one or more for-
eign states.”52  The third section deems “[a]n action or proceed-
ing falling under the Convention [to] arise under the laws and 
treaties of the United States” and provides U.S. district courts 
with original jurisdiction “over such an action or proceeding.”53   
Other sections provide broad rules for venue and removal 
of an action or proceeding falling under the Convention.54  
Chapter 2 also grants a district court that has jurisdiction un-
der its provisions the power to compel arbitration and appoint 
arbitrators in accordance with an agreement.55  It requires a 
district court to confirm an arbitration award that a party 
seeks to confirm unless the party seeks the confirmation more 
than three years after winning the award or if the recognition 
or enforcement of the award may be refused on grounds speci-
fied in the Convention.56 Chapter 2’s concluding section pro-
vides that Chapter 1 applies to arbitration agreements falling 
under the Convention to the extent that Chapter 1 does not 
conflict with Chapter 2 or the Convention.57 
 The United States has several foreign policy interests at 
stake in the consistent enforcement of international arbitration 
                                                     
49 Id. art. V. 
50 9 U.S.C. § 208 (2006). 
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 204, 205 (2006). 
55 Id. at § 106. 
56 Id. § 207. 
57 Id. § 208. 
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agreements.  First, refusals to enforce valid international arbi-
tration agreements may undermine the United States’s posi-
tion as a “trusted trading partner in multilateral endeavors.”58  
Second, consistent enforcement of agreements in U.S. courts, 
“even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in 
a domestic context,” ensures the predictable enforcement of in-
ternational arbitration agreements.59  Finally, because the 
Convention promotes reciprocity among signatories that en-
force the Convention, failures to enforce international arbitra-
tion agreements might decrease domestic companies’ access to 
foreign markets by encouraging “unseemly and mutually de-
structive jockeying . . . to secure tactical litigation ad-
vantages.”60  These foreign policy interests have led the Su-
preme Court of the United States to announce an especially 
strong policy favoring the validity of international agreements 
to arbitrate.61   
B. Reverse Preemption Under McCarran-Ferguson  
The states traditionally have regulated domestic insurance 
industries.62  They initially regulated insurers to guarantee the 
solvency of these companies.63  These initial regulations com-
pelled insurance companies to demonstrate their financial abil-
ity to pay out insurance claims to policyholders64 and to show 
the long-term sustainability of their plans to cover insured 
risks.65  Over time, states developed a complex system of regu-
lations that controlled additional aspects of the sale of insur-
                                                     
58 See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 
539 (1995). 
59 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 
629 (1985). 
60 See Scherk v. Alerbto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516–17 (1974). 
61 Id. 
62 Ann Hilton Fisher, Small Employers and the Health Insurance Needs 
of Employees with High Health Care Costs: A Need for Better Models, 8 EMP. 
RTS. & EMPL. POL’Y J. 53, 63 (2004). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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ance such as rate setting,66 licensing of insurance brokers,67 
commercial advertising,68 and impermissible discrimination.69 
 The evolving intricacy of state regulation of insurance re-
sulted from insurance’s status as not “commerce” regulable by 
Congress—even when out-of-state providers sold insurance pol-
icies to citizens of another state.70  In its 1869 decision, Paul v. 
Virginia, the Supreme Court of the United States held that in-
surance was not interstate commerce.71  In Paul, Samuel Paul, 
an agent of several New York insurance companies, was con-
victed in Virginia of selling fire insurance without a license.72  
The Court affirmed Paul’s conviction on appeal,73 rejecting his 
argument that the application of Virginia’s licensing require-
ment to an out-of-state insurance company substantially inter-
fered with interstate commerce.74  It reasoned that the sale of 
an insurance policy is a local contractual transaction governed 
by state law rather than a transaction involving articles or sub-
jects of interstate trade or commerce.75 
 Seventy-five years later, the Court overruled Paul in 
                                                     
66 See generally Charles W. Havens III & Rita M. Theisen, The Applica-
tion of United States and EEC Antitrust Laws to Reinsurance and Insurance 
Pooling Agreements, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1299 (1985) (discussing a particular 
state regulation of rate setting in the context of McCarran-Ferguson).  
67 See Raymond A. Guenter, Rediscovering the McCarran-Ferguson Act's 
Commerce Clause Limitation, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 282 (2000) (“The core el-
ements of early state insurance regulation were the licensing of the insurance 
companies, insurance agents and brokers . . . .”). 
68 See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 
(1958). 
69 William Goddard, Swimming in the Wake of Dehoyos: When Federal 
Courts Sail into Disparate Impact Waters, Will State Regulation of Insurance 
Remain Above the Waves?, 10 CONN. INS. L.J. 369, 371 (2004). 
70 See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 177, 183-85 (1868), overruled in part 
by United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), as recog-
nized in Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999); see also U.S. Dept. of 
Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 499 (1993) (explaining that prior to South-
Eastern, the states’ domain over insurance regulation was “virtually exclu-
sive”). 
71 Paul, 75 U.S. at 183. 
72 Gene Matthew Eckel, The New Standard Applicable to State Taxation 
of a Nonresident — An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Treatment of the Priv-
ileges and Immunities Clause in Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 
32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1311, 1319 (1999). 
73 Id. 
74 See Paul, 75 U.S. at 182–83. 
75 Id. at 183.  
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South-Eastern Underwriters Association v. United States, hold-
ing for the first time that Congress had the power to regulate 
insurance pursuant to the Commerce Clause.76  In South-
Eastern, South-Eastern Underwriters Association (“SEUA”) 
was indicted for conspiring with other insurance companies to 
restrain interstate trade in violation of the Sherman Act.77  
SEUA relied on Paul to challenge the application of the Sher-
man Act to the sale of insurance as an unconstitutional exer-
cise of federal power.78  The Court rejected SEUA’s conten-
tion,79 relying on its Commerce Clause jurisprudence that had 
broadened the understanding of “commerce” following the New 
Deal.80   
 The potential implications of South-Eastern provoked 
concern among the states about the constitutional validity of 
their entire insurance regulation schemes.81  The decision effec-
tively applied all federal commerce legislation to insurance 
companies and thereby jeopardized any conflicting state insur-
ance regulation.82  Moreover, states were concerned that even if 
future legislation adopted by Congress was not intended to ap-
ply specifically to insurance industries, the legislation would 
preempt conflicting state regulation.83  They also feared that 
any state regulation that substantially burdened the interstate 
sale of insurance was constitutionally suspect under the 
                                                     
76 United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944), 
superseded by statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, ch. 20, 59 
Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006)), as 
recognized in Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996). 
77 See S.-E Underwriters Ass’n., 322 U.S. at 534. 
78 See id. at 545. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 545–53. 
81 Id. 
82 See Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 40 (1996). 
83 See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 499–500 (1993) (ex-
plaining that states feared the threat that South-Eastern posed to their vir-
tually exclusive regulation of insurance and that Congress responded by 
providing that federal legislation would not, by mere implication, preempt 
state law). 
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Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.84  
 To quell states’ concerns,85 Congress swiftly passed a bill 
that limited South-Eastern’s effect on state law.86  The bill, in-
troduced by Senators Patrick McCarran and Homer Fergu-
son,87 sparked debate that centered on the South-Eastern deci-
sion.88  The legislation, known as the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
expressly declared Congress’s position “that the continued reg-
ulation and taxation by the several States of the business of in-
surance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of 
the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to 
the regulation or taxation of such business by the several 
States.”89  To achieve this goal, section 2(b) further provided 
that state laws enacted to regulate the business of insurance 
reverse preempt federal laws that did not specifically relate to 
the business of insurance.90  Section 2(b), however, expressly 
excluded the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, and the Merchant Marine Act from federal laws 
that may be reverse preempted.91    
The language of section 2(b) demonstrates that McCarran-
Ferguson is primarily a rule of construction that federal and 
state courts must follow.92  If a party shows the three constitu-
tive elements of section 2(b), then that federal law “shall not be 
                                                     
84 Cf. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808–10 (2008) 
(articulating that courts applying the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
will not uphold state laws that unduly burden interstate commerce); Foster-
Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928) (applying the dormant 
Commerce Clause principle prior to South-Eastern). 
85 See FTC v. Travelers Health Ass’n, 362 U.S. 293, 299 (1960). 
86 See Fabe, 508 U.S. at 500 (explaining how “Congress moved quickly to 
restore the supremacy of the States in the realm of insurance regulation . . . 
[by] enact[ing] the McCarran-Ferguson Act within a year of the decision in 
South-Eastern Underwriters.”). 
87 See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 547 n.20 
(1978). 
88 See 91 CONG. REC. 1,478 (1945) (quoting Senator Claude Pepper as in-
troducing the bill as a response to the South-Eastern decision and arguing 
that the adoption of the bill would “emasculat[e] the . . . decision . . . .”).   
89 McCarran Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as 15 
U.S.C. § 1011 (2009)).  
90 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). 
91 Id. § 1014. 
92 Id. § 1012(b) (“No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, im-
pair, or supersede any law of any state.”) (emphasis added).   
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construed” to preempt state law.93  First, the federal law must 
not specifically relate to the “business of insurance.”94  Second, 
the state law must have been “enacted for the purpose of regu-
lating the business of insurance.”95  And third, the federal law 
must be an “Act of Congress.”96  Upon establishing these three 
elements, McCarran-Ferguson directs courts to reject a party’s 
preemption defense.97  If one or more of the three elements is 
not established, then the ordinary rules of preemption apply.98 
Quite simply, a federal law “specifically relates to the 
business of insurance” when the word “insurance” appears in 
the text of the law.99  The Supreme Court explained in Barnett 
Bank, N.A. v. Nelson that the ordinary rules of preemption ap-
plied to a federal bank statute because it referred to “insur-
ance,” thus failing to meet section 2(b)’s requirement that the 
federal law not specifically relate to insurance.100  The Court 
emphasized the federal bank statute’s explicit use of the word 
“insurance” when it permitted national banks to “act as the 
agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company,” and to “so-
licit[] and sell[] insurance.”101  But determining whether a state 
law was “enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of 
insurance” is a factor-based inquiry.102  The three relevant fac-
tors are whether the activity regulated by state law (1) trans-
fers or spreads the insured risk; (2) is integral to the insurer–
policyholder relationship; and (3) is specific to the insurance 
industry.103  Although none of these factors is dispositive, the 
more that are present, 104 the more likely a court is to hold that 
                                                     
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1996). 
99  15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2009). 
100 Nelson, 517 U.S. at 38–41. 
101 Id. at 39 (citation and internal quotes omitted).  
102 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). 
103 Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982) (citing 
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979)). 
104 See Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129. 
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this second element of Section 2(b) has been met.105  
C. Reverse Preemption of Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act 
Despite the preemptive effect of the Federal Arbitration 
Act’s substantive guarantee regarding the validity and enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements, several states have relied up-
on McCarran-Ferguson’s reverse preemption rule to continue 
regulating and even prohibit arbitration agreements in insur-
ance contracts.106  Consequently, states have not hesitated to 
continue regulating private parties’ decisions to arbitrate in-
surance disputes.107 
In response to the increasing prevalence of arbitration 
agreements in insurance contracts,108 states enacted regula-
tions that included outright bans on the agreements;109 re-
quirements on the wording, size, or location of the text of arbi-
tration provisions in a contract;110 and mandatory approval of 
                                                     
105 See id. (explaining that these three factors aid a court’s determination 
of whether a state law was enacted for the purpose of regulating the business 
of insurance).  Another aspect that may be relevant to this inquiry is whether 
the “state law” at hand is a state statute, administrative regulation, or com-
mon law rule.  See generally Randall, supra note 7 (arguing that courts’ deci-
sional rules might not be state laws protected by McCarran–Ferguson be-
cause they were not “enacted”).  
106 See Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Inman, 436 F.3d 490, 494 (5th 
Cir. 2006); Davister Corp. v. United Republic Life Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 1277, 
1279–81 (10th Cir. 1998); Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 384 (Colo. 2003).  Af-
ter South-Eastern, the Federal Arbitration Act applied to insurance contracts 
by virtue of their status as “commerce.” Cf. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (providing for 
the enforceability of arbitration clauses in contracts “evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce”); United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 
533, 553 (1944) (holding that insurance contracts are part of interstate com-
merce). Thus, the reverse preemption of the Federal Arbitration Act by state 
laws regulating domestic insurance contracts follows from both McCarran–
Ferguson’s historical context and legislative history.  
107 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-201(b)(1)–(2) (2009); CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 1363.1 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-403 (2009); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 9-9-2 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (2008); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 417.050 (LexisNexis 2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (2009); N.Y. INS. 
LAW § 7417 (Consol. 2011). 
108 Randall, supra note 7, at 253.  
109 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2 (2010) (excepting “[a]ny contract of in-
surance” from its general provision that arbitration agreements shall be en-
forced). 
110 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1363.1 (West 2008) (providing 
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the agreements by state officials.111  These state laws generally 
aim to protect consumers and policyholders in insurance 
agreements, as evidenced by the mandates of these laws.112  
For example, California and Louisiana regulate arbitration 
clauses in contracts for health insurance for the purported pur-
pose of protecting consumers by highlighting the presence and 
scope of arbitration agreements.113  
Courts addressing whether McCarran-Ferguson permits 
these state laws to reverse preempt the Federal Arbitration 
Act’s general guarantee of the enforceability of domestic arbi-
tration agreements have answered the question in the affirma-
tive.114  For example, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth 
and Tenth Circuit as well as the Supreme Court of Colorado 
have all addressed the issue of whether McCarran-Ferguson 
applies to the Federal Arbitration Act.115  All have held that 
state laws regulating the business of insurance reverse 
preempt Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration pursuant to 
McCarran-Ferguson.116 
III. WHETHER MCCARRAN-FERGUSON PERMITS STATE LAW TO 
REVERSE PREEMPT THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 
  In cases in which parties have relied upon the substan-
tive guarantees of the New York Convention to uphold the va-
lidity of an arbitration agreement, courts have split on whether 
                                                                                                                       
that any contract clause restricting the right to a jury trial in health care in-
surance plans must be “prominently displayed” in a “separate article” imme-
diately before the signature line on an enrollment form).   
111 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 631.20, 631.85 (2009) (requiring arbitration 
clauses to be approved by the state insurance commissioner). 
112 Johnson, supra note 13, at 582–83. 
113 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1363.1 (2009); LA. REV. STAT. § 22:868 
(2009). 
114 See Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Inman, 436 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2006); Da-
vister Corp. v. United Republic Life Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 1998); 
Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375 (Colo. 2003).   
115 Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 436 F.3d at 494; Davister Corp., 152 F.3d at 
1279–81; Allen, 71 P.3d at 384.   
116 Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 436 F.3d at 494; Davister Corp., 152 F.3d at 
1279–81; Allen, 71 P.3d at 384.   
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McCarran-Ferguson permits state law to reverse preempt the 
New York Convention, as implemented through Chapter 2 of 
the Federal Arbitration Act.117  Both the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
for the Second and Fifth Circuits have addressed this issue and 
reached contrary conclusions after considering whether the 
New York Convention is a self-executing or a non-self-
executing treaty.118   
Self-execution stands for the principle that a treaty has an 
independent force of law in U.S. courts and does not need to be 
implemented by domestic legislation.119  In resolving the re-
verse preemption question, the self-execution framework be-
gins by asking whether the New York Convention is a self-
executing treaty that has the force of law in U.S. courts.120  If 
so, then the Convention operates independently of Chapter 2 of 
the Federal Arbitration Act.121  As such, the Convention would 
not rely on an “Act of Congress” and McCarran-Ferguson would 
not apply to the Convention.  If it is a non-self-executing treaty, 
then the Convention has no preemptive effect of federal law122 
unless it relies on Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 
which made the Convention applicable in U.S. courts (i.e., exe-
cuted the Convention).123  The implication of this conclusion is 
that the Convention would necessarily rely on Chapter 2, 
which would presumably be an “Act of Congress” that “shall 
[not] be construed” to preempt a State law as per McCarran-
Ferguson.  
 The Second Circuit, in Stephens v. American Internation-
al Insurance Company, held that McCarran-Ferguson permits 
state law to reverse preempt the New York Convention as im-
                                                     
117 Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 436 F.3d at 494; Davister Corp., 152 F.3d at 
1279–81; Allen, 71 P.3d at 384.   
118 Am. Bankers Ins. Co. 436 F.3d at 494; Davister Corp., 152 F.3d at 
1279–81; Allen, 71 P.3d at 384.   
119 See generally Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829), overruled in part 
by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833). 
120 Cf. Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995) (ex-
plaining that“[t]his argument fails because the Convention is not self-
executing, and therefore, relies upon an Act of Congress for its implementa-
tion”).  
121 Id. 
122 See Foster, 27 U.S. at 314–17. 
123 See generally 9 U.S.C. § 1 (titled Enforcement of the Convention). 
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plemented through Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.124  
The Stephens court concluded that a Kentucky law reverse 
preempted the New York Convention because the Convention 
was a non-self-executing treaty that required domestic legisla-
tion to have effect in U.S. courts.125  In Stephens, a Kentucky 
reinsurance company sold insurance policies to several insur-
ance companies, two of which were based in Britain.126  After a 
Kentucky court found the Kentucky reinsurance company to be 
insolvent, the court appointed the Commissioner of Insurance 
to oversee the company’s liquidation.127  The Commissioner 
sought to recover insurance premiums from the two British 
companies, one of which moved to compel arbitration pursuant 
to the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the Federal Ar-
bitration Act.128  The Commissioner argued that Kentucky law 
prohibited arbitration agreements and that McCarran-
Ferguson saved this prohibition from preemption.129   
The Second Circuit agreed with the Commissioner of In-
surance, holding that “the Convention is not self-executing, and 
therefore, relies upon an Act of Congress for its implementa-
tion.”130  As the sole basis for its reasoning, the court quoted 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Foster v. Neilson: 
It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equiva-
lent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, 
without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms 
of the stipulation import a contract-when either of the parties 
engage to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to 
the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature 
must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the 
court.131  
Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that the Commissioner 
                                                     
124 See Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 42. 
127 Id. 
128 See id. at 42–43. 
129 See id. at 43–44. 
130 Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45. 
131 Id. at 45 (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 313-14 (1829)). 
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could not be compelled to arbitrate.132 
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit, in Safety National Casualty 
Corporation v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London,133 held 
that McCarran-Ferguson did not permit state law to reverse 
preempt the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the Feder-
al Arbitration Act.134  In Safety National, a Louisiana insur-
ance fund assigned its rights under an insurance contract with 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London to Safety National 
Casualty Insurance Corporation.135  Despite Louisiana law 
prohibiting arbitration agreements in insurance contracts, the 
Louisiana insurance fund’s insurance agreement contained an 
arbitration clause.136  Safety National sued Underwriters in 
federal court and Underwriters moved to compel arbitration 
pursuant to the arbitration agreement.137  Underwriters argued 
that McCarran-Ferguson permitted Louisiana’s law to reverse 
preempt the New York Convention because Chapter 2 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, which implemented the treaty, was an 
“Act of Congress.”138 
 Although the majority in Safety National concluded that 
the self-executing nature of the Convention was “unclear,”139 
the concurring and dissenting opinions diverged based on a 
disagreement about the self-execution status of the New York 
Convention.140  Judge Owen, writing for the majority, gave a 
four-fold rationale for the court’s conclusion that the New York 
Convention preempted the Louisiana law even if it is a non-
self-executing treaty.141  The court’s first rationale was that be-
                                                     
132 See id at 46. 
133 Cf. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, Lon-
don, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
134 See id. at 732; see also Kevin D. Oles, Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Cer-
tain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2010), 25 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1095, 1107-08 (2010) (recognizing the conflict between 
Safety National and Stephens). 
135 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 746 (Elrod, J., dissenting). 
136 See id. at 746–47. 
137 See id. at 746. 
138 Id. at 748–49. 
139 Id. at 721–22 (en banc). 
140 See id. at 733 (Clement, J., concurring) (“[T]he plain text of Article II 
of the Convention compels a finding of self-execution.”); id. at 737 (Elrod, J., 
dissenting). 
141 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 717-732. 
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cause Chapter 2 of the New York Convention did not modify or 
conflict with the New York Convention, Chapter 2 did not “re-
place or displace” the Convention as the operative source of law 
in U.S. courts.142  The Convention was still a treaty that oper-
ated as “an international agreement or contract negotiated by 
the Executive Branch and ratified by the Senate, not Con-
gress.”143   
The majority’s second rationale was that it would make lit-
tle sense for Congress to have intended the words “Act of Con-
gress” in McCarran-Ferguson not to apply to self-executing 
treaties, but to apply to non-self-executing treaties that had 
been implemented through federal legislation.144  Its third ra-
tionale was that the text of section 203 of Chapter 2 provides 
that “an action or proceeding falling under the Convention 
shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the 
United States.”145  The court explained that this language 
demonstrated Congress’s intent for the Convention to operate 
independent of implementing legislation.146  The court’s fourth 
justification was that because McCarran-Ferguson forbids judi-
cial “construction” of a federal law to preempt certain state 
laws, a court would necessarily need to “construe” the provi-
sions of the New York Convention rather than Chapter 2 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act.147 
 Judge Clement’s concurrence concluded that the New 
York Convention preempted the Louisiana law because the 
Convention was self-executing.148  Under the Supreme Court’s 
test in Medellín v. Texas, a provision of a treaty is self-
executing if the provision is directed to the courts of the United 
States and if the provision uses mandatory language—such as 
“shall” or “must”—in directing U.S. courts to take a certain ac-
                                                     
142 Id. at 722–23.  
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 723. 
145 Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2006)). 
146 Id. at 724. 
147 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 724. 
148 Id. at 733 (Clement, J., concurring). 
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tion.149  Because the third paragraph of Article II of the Con-
vention provides that “the Court” of Contracting States “shall” 
refer the parties to arbitration, Judge Clement would have held 
the provision to be self-executing.150  Judge Clement would 
have upheld the arbitration provision because the self-
executing nature of the treaty permitted the treaty to operate 
independent of any Act of Congress, which would be subject to 
reverse preemption under McCarran-Ferguson.151 
 In her dissenting opinion, Judge Elrod argued that 
McCarran-Ferguson saved the Louisiana law from preemption 
because the Convention was a non-self-executing treaty and 
therefore relied on Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act to 
have the force and effect of law in U.S. courts.152  With regard 
to the issue of whether the New York Convention was an “Act 
of Congress” under McCarran–Ferguson, Judge Elrod first crit-
icized the court’s “failure to ask the right question at the out-
set.”153  After referring to the Second Circuit’s decision in Ste-
phens, she justified her conclusion that the treaty was non-self-
executing because the treaty had been implemented through 
domestic legislation.154 Judge Elrod criticized the majority’s 
failure to provide any support for its proposition that a non-
self-executing treaty could have any preemptive effect with re-
gard to state law.155  She also rebutted the majority’s analysis 
that a court construing the substantive guarantees of the Con-
vention must refer to and construe the textual provisions of the 
Convention itself.156  She argued that this contradicted the 
principle that, once implemented, non-self-executing treaties 
only have the force of law via the implementing legislation.157 
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE SELF-EXECUTION FRAMEWORK 
The self-execution doctrine fails to adequately answer the 
                                                     
149 See id. 
150 See id. at 734. 
151 Id. 732-737.  
152 Id. at 735 (Elrod, J., dissenting). 
153 See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 735 (Elrod, J., dissenting). 
154 Id. at 742–43. 
155 Id. at 740. 
156 Id. at 741–42. 
157 See id. 
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question of whether McCarran-Ferguson permits a state to re-
verse preempt the New York Convention because it ignores ac-
cepted methods of statutory interpretation, is irrelevant out-
side the context of establishing the existence of a legal right 
under a treaty, and fails to answer the particular legal question 
posed by the clash between McCarran-Ferguson and the New 
York Convention.  
Because the majority, concurrence, and dissent in Safety 
National as well as the Second Circuit in Stephens approached 
the issue assuming some relevance of the self-execution ques-
tion, none reached a conclusion in a satisfactory manner.  Con-
trary to Judge Elrod’s allegation that the Safety National ma-
jority asked the wrong question as to whether the Convention, 
as domestically implemented, was an “Act of Congress,”158 this 
question was precisely the correct one.  Asking whether the 
Convention is or is not self-executing, as did Judge Elrod’s dis-
sent and Judge Clement’s concurrence, is the wrong question 
because it fails to consider adequately the purposes animating 
McCarran-Ferguson.  It presupposes that Chapter 2 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act is an Act of Congress under McCarran-
Ferguson and that the New York Convention is not.  The right 
question—and the best way to understand the issue—is: what 
was Congress’s purpose in enacting McCarran-Ferguson? 
Although the Safety National majority was the closest to 
the mark by giving some credence to the purposes motivating 
McCarran-Ferguson, it merely paid lip service to Congressional 
intent.  It pointed out that Judge Elrod’s position would require 
the application of McCarran-Ferguson to a self-executing trea-
ty, but not to non-self-executing treaties that are domestically 
implemented, which Congress was “unlikely” to have intend-
ed.159  The majority reasoned that if this was Congress’s intent, 
then it would have added the words “or any treaty requiring 
congressional implementation” after the words “Act of Con-
gress.”160  The majority had thereby reframed the question as 
                                                     
158 Id. at 738. 
159 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 724. 
160 Id. 
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follows: if the United States signed a treaty recognizing indi-
viduals’ private agreements to arbitrate disputes, how or why 
would Congress’s subsequent passage of McCarran-Ferguson 
reflect Congress’s intent that any future domestic codification 
of that guarantee in the Federal Arbitration Act give to the 
states the right to decide whether that guarantee was applica-
ble in the business of insurance?161 
 But perhaps the passage of an Act of Congress to imple-
ment a treaty was irrelevant to the drafters of McCarran-
Ferguson.  So long as courts do not find an Act of Congress to 
preempt a state law specific to insurance, McCarran-Ferguson 
is satisfied.  By enacting McCarran-Ferguson, Congress recog-
nized that continued regulation of insurance by the several 
states was in the public interest.162  It intended that no future 
Congressional action would, by mere implication, interfere with 
the states’ ability to regulate insurance.163  Congressional 
commerce legislation—with either purely domestic or both do-
mestic and international implications—has the potential to in-
terfere with the state regulation of insurance.  Hence, a Con-
gressional action that guarantees the domestic enforceability of 
a treaty and that may interfere with the state regulation of in-
surance poses the same risk that Congress sought to address in 
passing McCarran-Ferguson.  As such, Congress arguably in-
tended McCarran-Ferguson to apply to any federal law—treaty 
or statute—that potentially implicated the business of insur-
ance.   
Additionally, the self-execution doctrine has relevance only 
in determining whether a party is asserting a domestically en-
forceable right under a treaty.  The self-execution doctrine had 
little, if anything, to do with reverse preemption under McCar-
ran-Ferguson until the Second Circuit’s decision in Stephens. 
Prior to Stephens, the self-execution doctrine had been used on-
ly to answer the particular legal question of whether a treaty 
confers upon an individual a right that is domestically enforce-
able in U.S. courts.164  Thus, the Stephens court perhaps ac-
cepted a faulty premise: that the self-execution doctrine is rele-
                                                     
161 Id. at 720. 
162 See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2006). 
163 See id. § 1012(a). 
164 Safety Nat’l Cas Corp., 587 F.3d at 730. 
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vant once Congress has enacted legislation implementing a 
treaty.   
The Supreme Court of the United States first developed 
the self-execution doctrine in its 1829 decision of Foster v. 
Neilson.165  In Foster, the plaintiff asserted rights over land in 
Louisiana pursuant to a land grant that was recognized by a 
treaty between the United States and Spain.166  The Court sid-
ed with the defendant, holding that the treaty between the 
United States and Spain was not self-executing.167  It reasoned 
that although a treaty is equivalent to a legislative act under 
the Supremacy Clause, it has no domestic legal effect unless 
Congress “[ha]s carried [it] into execution.”168 The test for 
whether a treaty is self-executing, Foster counsels, is whether 
the terms of a treaty are contractual (i.e., general obligations of 
the parties to the treaty) rather than legal (i.e., obligations that 
are directed to the judicial branches of the parties to the trea-
ty).169  Given the context in which the Court first developed the 
concept of self-executing treaties, courts in the United States 
have continued to use the doctrine only when the parties dis-
pute whether a treaty confers a right that is legally enforceable 
in U.S. courts.170  Foster implicitly instructs that where a party 
asserts a right under a treaty, the question is first whether the 
obligation is one the United States has undertaken by ratifying 
                                                     
165 See generally Foster v. Neilsen, 27 U.S. 253 (1829). 
166 See id. 
167 Id. 
168 See id. at 314. 
169 See id. 
170 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-05 (2008) (explaining the 
self-execution doctrine as intended to answer the question of whether an in-
ternational treaty creates binding domestic law absent of domestic implanta-
tion); see, e.g., Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“This mul-
tilateral treaty is non-self-executing and thus does not itself create any rights 
enforceable in U.S. courts.”).  However, determining that a treaty is self-
executing is not dispositive of whether the law actually confers a domestically 
enforceable right.   See Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 549 F.3d 
605, 615 (3d Cir. 2008) (“By itself, the status of ‘self-executing’ does not an-
swer the question of whether a document creates a private right of enforce-
ment.”).  
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or acceding to the treaty.171  The Court implied that execution 
could occur in one of two ways: either the treaty has been car-
ried into effect through domestic legislation or the treaty is car-
ried into execution by its own terms.172  Where the United 
States has passed domestic legislation to give the treaty legal 
effect in U.S. courts, then the party asserting the right under 
the treaty has a legally enforceable right in U.S. courts.173  In 
such circumstances, it is unlikely that a party would argue that 
another party had no domestically enforceable legal rights un-
der the treaty, as it has already been implemented through 
domestic legislation.   
Only where Congress has not passed legislation carrying 
the treaty into execution is the self-execution, non-self-
execution dichotomy relevant.174  If the terms of a treaty reflect 
that the parties have bound their courts to follow the terms of 
the treaty, then the treaty is self-executing175 and a party may 
assert a right under the treaty regardless of the absence of do-
mestic legislation.176  Alternatively phrased, if a treaty is self-
executing, then the legal conclusion a court must reach is that 
the treaty confers on a party a domestically enforceable right 
despite the absence of domestic legislation conferring the right 
pursuant to the treaty. 
Given the context in which the self-execution doctrine 
arose—and the way in which the doctrine has been applied by 
courts in the United States since Foster—reliance on the doc-
trine to address whether McCarran-Ferguson permits state law 
to reverse preempt the New York Convention is misplaced.  
The Court developed the self-execution doctrine as a way to an-
swer the question of whether a treaty confers upon a party a 
right that is enforceable in U.S. courts.177  Because Congress 
has passed legislation to carry the New York Convention into 
execution,178 the question of whether a party has a right en-
forceable in U.S. courts has already been asked and answered. 
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Because Congress has already carried the New York Conven-
tion into execution,179 raising the issue of self-execution in the 
McCarran-Ferguson context is erroneous.  Ignoring the ques-
tion of whether a treaty confers upon a party a domestically en-
forceable right, the Fifth and Second Circuits have used the 
doctrine of self-execution to ask how a party is asserting the 
domestically enforceable right under the New York Convention.  
The mootness of this question is underscored by Foster’s expla-
nation that the self-execution question only becomes relevant 
in the absence of domestic legislation.180  Following Foster’s log-
ic, a self-execution analysis of a treaty that has been domesti-
cally implemented is irrelevant.181   
Rather, opinions from the Fifth and Second Circuits have 
taken the self-execution doctrine out of its element.  According 
to Foster, if a treaty operates “without the aid of any legislative 
provision,” then it is self-executing.182  To hold that McCarran-
Ferguson does or does not apply to the New York Convention 
because the latter is or is not self-executing requires a falla-
cious understanding of Foster by flipping the precedent and an-
tecedent as follows: if a treaty is self-executing, then it operates 
“without the aid of any legislative provision.”183  By the reason-
ing of the Fifth and Second Circuit opinions, only if the New 
York Convention operates without the aid of domestic legisla-
tion—Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act—does McCar-
ran-Ferguson not apply to the New York Convention.184  This 
reasoning is circular because it requires ascertaining whether 
the Convention operates “without the aid of any legislative 
provision” to determine whether the Convention is self-
executing for the purpose of concluding that the Convention 
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operates “without the aid of any legislative provision.”185  It is 
further flawed because, under the self-execution doctrine as it 
originated in Foster, ascertaining whether a treaty operates 
“without the aid of any legislative provision” requires a deter-
mination of whether the treaty is self-executing for the purpose 
of concluding that a party may assert rights conferred by the 
treaty in U.S. courts.186   
And regardless of a court’s outcome in the self-execution 
analysis, a party asserting rights under the New York Conven-
tion necessarily relies on Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act.  The Safety National majority reasoned that regardless of 
whether a treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing, legisla-
tion that implements a treaty does not replace or displace the 
implemented treaty.187  As such, the Safety National majority’s 
reasoning would proceed as follows: even if a treaty operates 
through domestic legislation, the treaty is still a treaty and not 
an Act of Congress subject to McCarran-Ferguson.188  Although 
it is not arguable that subsequently enacted legislation dissi-
pates the legal agreement that the President makes with other 
nations, in order to assert the rights guaranteed by the New 
York Convention, a party must rely on either of the first two 
chapters of the Federal Arbitration Act.  Consider the following 
hypothetical situations: 
A, Inc., a British reinsurance company, and B, Co., a Loui-
siana insurance company, agree to arbitrate disputes arising 
out of an international reinsurance agreement despite Louisi-
ana’s prohibition on arbitration agreements in insurance con-
tracts.   
If A sued B in federal court to collect its past due premi-
ums from B, B could move to compel arbitration.  B could rely 
on Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which gives the 
federal court the authority to compel arbitration “in accordance 
with the agreement at any place therein provided.”189  In per-
mitting the court to compel arbitration in accordance with the 
arbitration agreement, section 206 of Chapter 2 would conflict 
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with and arguably preempt Louisiana’s prohibition against ar-
bitration agreements in insurance contracts.  Given the poten-
tial for such a conflict, McCarran-Ferguson would require that 
this provision of an Act of Congress not be construed to 
preempt Louisiana law.  Such a construction of section 206 
would require the exercising of a federal court’s power to grant 
a motion to compel arbitration in that case.  Alternatively, B 
could rely on section 4 of Chapter 1, which permits courts to 
compel arbitration.  This would still be a provision in an Act of 
Congress, however, to which McCarran-Ferguson would also 
apply. 
If B sued A in federal court for failure to pay claims under 
the reinsurance contract, A similarly could move to compel ar-
bitration under either section 206 of Chapter 2 or section 4 of 
Chapter 1.  However, this would require construing a provision 
of an Act of Congress to preempt Louisiana law in direct con-
travention of McCarran-Ferguson, as would the previously pre-
sented hypothetical.   
Congress required a party relying on the New York Con-
vention to also rely on an Act of Congress.  Without reliance on 
either of the first two chapters of the Federal Arbitration Act, a 
federal court presumably would lack the power to compel par-
ties to arbitrate their disputes.  And section 201 of Chapter 2 
provides that the New York Convention “shall be enforced in 
United States courts in accordance with this Chapter.”190  
Thus, the self-execution question provides little help in under-
standing why McCarran-Ferguson would not reverse preempt 
the New York Convention.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
 The Second and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals’s method 
of resolving whether McCarran-Ferguson permits a state law 
to reverse preempt the New York Convention has turned on 
whether the Convention is self-executing or non-self-
                                                     
190 Id. § 201. 
68 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol.  3:2 
executing.191  This approach fails to take into account common-
ly accepted method of statutory interpretation, as it almost 
completely disregards Congress’s purpose in passing McCar-
ran-Ferguson.  Moreover, it takes the self-execution doctrine 
out of a context to resolve a legal issue to which the doctrine 
was not intended to apply.  Regardless of whether the Conven-
tion is or is not self-executing, a party asserting its rights to 
have a federal court recognize and enforce its international ar-
bitration agreement under the Convention must necessarily re-
ly on an Act of Congress.  A party making such a claim must 
rely on the Federal Arbitration Act, which provides a federal 
court with the express authority to compel arbitration.  The 
Federal Arbitration Act is an Act of Congress under McCarran-
Ferguson, and McCarran-Ferguson therefore compels a reading 
of the Federal Arbitration Act that federal courts have no au-
thority to compel arbitration where doing so would effectively 
preempt a state insurance law.  Because the self-execution 
framework fails to answer the interpretive problem posed by 
McCarran-Ferguson, courts should consider alternatives ap-
proaches that rely more substantially on congressional intent. 
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